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Abstract 
 
Early states like China, India, Italy and Greece have been experiencing more rapid 
economic growth in recent decades than have later-comers to agriculture and statehood 
like New Guinea, the Congo, and Uruguay.  We show that more rapid growth by early 
starters has been the norm in economic history, and that the “reversal of fortune” 
associated with the European overseas expansion that began around 1500 was both 
exceptional and temporary.  We demonstrate not only that the colonial era reversal was in 
the process of being reversed between 1960 and 1998, but also that the growth rate 
advantage conferred by early development in the latter period was several times greater 
than the growth rate disadvantage that it conferred during the colonial era, implying a 
rapid undoing of the first reversal. 
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Early Starts, Reversals and Catchup in The Process of Economic Development
∗ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
  It has become clear, of late, that history will not allow itself to be ignored in the 
study of economic development.  Hall and Jones (1999) demonstrate that countries in 
which European languages are widely spoken, in many cases as a result of their colonial 
experience, have better institutions, which explain a large part of the variance in 
countries’ per capita output levels.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show that 
countries in which European settlement was discouraged by high mortality rates 
experienced slower growth than others in the five millennia after 1500.  Hibbs and 
Olsson (2004), who find institutions a strong predictor of income levels, show that cross-
country differences in the dates of transition to agriculture, most of which occurred 
thousands of years ago, explain 53% of the variance in 1997 per capita income and 38% 
of the variance in the quality of institutions.  Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (hereafter 
BCP, 2002) show that an early and durable history of political organization above the 
tribal level is a powerful predictor of recent rates of economic growth.   
 
  In this paper, we begin with these observations that history has left its mark on 
levels and rates of economic development, and we focus on an important difference 
between the era of European expansion and colonization (roughly 1500 to 1960) and both 
the millennia which proceeded it and the shorter recent era of decolonization and 
increasing global trade.  Up to about 1500, the rates of economic, technological, and 
political development of the world’s societies are fairly well predicted by the factors 
emphasized by Hibbs and Olsson, Bockstette et al., and Diamond (1998)—i.e., the 
presence or absence of early agricultural development and the associated growth of 
population densities and social complexity, including larger scale polities and more 
complex divisions of labor.  By two thousand years ago, centuries of agricultural 
development had led to the presence of dense populations, tax collecting states, and cities 
in parts of China, India, West Asia, the Mediterranean basin, Mesoamerica and Peru; but 
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large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Australia, the Americas, and northernmost Eurasia 
continued to be occupied by peoples for whom agriculture was unimportant or unknown.  
Map 1 shows the distribution of states around the world during the years 1 – 50 C.E. 
according to the index of state history used in Chanda and Putterman (forthcoming) and 
using the borders of present-day countries rather than of ancient states and empires to 
define its observations.
1  In the agrarian states of the old world, metallurgy, coinage, 
animal drawn plows, the military use of the horse, and written language were well 
developed many centuries ago, while lands without agriculture (Australia, Southern 
Africa, eastern and southern South America, and the far north of both hemispheres) and 
those with less productive agricultures (New Guinea, Polynesia, what is now the eastern 
United States) lagged behind in population growth and technological development.  The 
new world agrarian states of Mesoamerica and Peru, which were relative newcomers to 
agriculture, also lagged behind old world states in key technologies that, along with their 
lack of resistance to European diseases, would permit their easy conquest by old world 
states a millenium and a half later (Diamond, 1998).
2 
 
  Despite the spread of both old and new world civilizations during the millennium 
prior to 1500, the world of that year still contained large areas with little or no 
agriculture, writing, metallurgy, or supra-tribal political organization, and levels of 
economic and technological development still largely followed the patterns set by early 
agriculture. Historian Angus Maddison points out the similarity in the levels of 
development of the old world core areas of Europe, the Ottoman Empire, India and the 
Far East around 1500.  Map 2 shows the depth of indigenous state history associated as of 
                                                 
1 The data can be found in an Appendix, Putterman (2003).  As described further, below, the index accords 
a higher score to a present-day country if, during the period in question, it was politically integrated above 
the tribal level, if the state that ruled it was indigenous, and if that state covered more of the present 
country’s territory.  Current borders are used because the variable was developed to explain differences in 
growth rates and levels of development among contemporary countries.  Use of current borders means, for 
example, that what is now Italy is considered to have had state-level organization in 1 C.E. by virtue of the 
presence of the Roman Empire. 
2 According to Diamond and others, the differences in disease resistance were not unrelated to differences 
in agricultural development.  In particular, he argues that diseases like smallpox had long ago jumped to 
densely-settled Eurasians from their sheep, goats, cattle and pigs, conferring a degree of resistance on the 
Eurasian populations of the age of exploration.  Because the people of the Americas had passed out of the 
range of Eurasian disease transmission before the advent of Eurasian animal husbandry, and because the 
Americas did not have such animals on hand to domesticate, they lacked such resistance.    3
that year with most of what are now the world’s countries, again delineated by present-
day borders.
3 
 
It was only after Western Europe’s outward expansion to colonize first the New 
World, then much of Asia, and eventually most of Africa, the Middle East, and still more 
of Asia, that the relationship between early agricultural development and level of income 
was dramatically changed.  With Northwestern Europe, once a hinterland of the 
Mediterannean civilizations, outpacing and dominating the world’s other regions 
including the core old world civilizations, it was the relatively underdeveloped and 
temperate lands of the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and (to a lesser extent) 
Argentina, Chile and South Africa that progressed most rapidly. Hotter and/or more 
densely populated countries like Mexico and Brazil occupied a middle position, while 
countries that Europeans settled sparsely, late, or not at all, whether due to disease, 
climate, or high population density—examples include most of sub-Saharan Africa, 
India, China, Indonesia, and New Guinea—fell to the bottom of the world’s income 
pyramid.  This post-1500 pattern underlies the “reversal of fortune”—the slower growth 
after 1500 of colonized lands that were either more deadly to Europeans, in terms of 
disease, or more densely populated in 1500—pointed out by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (hereafter AJR 2001, AJR 2002).   
 
  The central theme of this paper is that the pattern of slower growth by the 
previously more advanced colonized (or, more generally, non-European) areas after 1500 
is exceptional, and that the reversal that AJR document is in fact limited to the era of 
colonialism, ending around 1960.  Since the post-World War II era of decolonization and 
global trade has gotten into full swing, the disadvantage under which history’s early 
starters labored in the era of colonialism has changed again into an apparent advantage.  
While late-starters like New Guinea and sub-Saharan Africa recorded limited economic 
                                                 
3 The data are again those used in Chanda and Putterman (forthcoming) and available in full in Putterman 
(2003).  Due to unavailability of other data used in that study and the present one, the state history variable 
was not calculated for most countries that belonged to the Soviet bloc during the 1950s to 1980s, and for 
some others.    4
growth in the late 20
th Century and intermediate cases like Mexico and Brazil struggled, 
more and more of the early starters took off into rapid economic growth 
 
Specifically, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate, statistically, three 
propositions: (1) up to 1500, economic change and technological progress followed more 
or less predictably upon early agricultural development; (2) from 1500 to 1960, there was 
a reversal of the fortunes of most non-European lands, as emptier countries were to a 
large extent developed by Europeans while other non-European regions felt the negative 
impact of a Europe-dominated world; and finally, (3) from 1960 to the present, there has 
been a relative resurgence of non-European earlier developers and a resurfacing of the 
disadvantages of those non-European societies (apart from the few “empty lands” settled 
overwhelmingly by Europeans) that were behind in 1500 and are catching up slowly if at 
all today.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we discuss our empirical strategy 
and the data to be used.  In section 3, we present our derivation of new estimates of per 
capita GDP in 1500.  Section 4 examines the influence of early agrarian and state 
development on incomes in 1500, while sections 5 and 6 examine the colonial era 
“reversal of fortune” and the post-War “reversal of the reversal,” respectively.  We 
summarize and discuss the implications of these findings, including those for the recent 
debate about institutions and growth (AJR, 2001, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004), in section 7. 
 
 
2. Empirical Strategy and Data 
 
  To show that early agrarian state development predicts level of development in 
1500, we employ as measures of early development the number of years since the onset 
of agriculture in a region, and measures of state history as of 50, 500, and 1000 CE.  We 
measure development in 1500 using per capita income in that year as provided by direct 
estimates, and as extrapolated based on the level of urbanization in 1500, and also on 
both the level of urbanization and population density in 1500.  To confirm the reversal of   5
fortune from 1500 to 1960, we use two alternative dependent variables, per capita income 
in 1960 and the growth rate of per capita income from 1500 to 1960, and we use as 
explanatory variables and measures of development in 1500 the estimates of per capita 
income in that year.  To show that during 1960 to 2000 the colonial era reversal has itself 
been in the process of being reversed, we use growth rate of per capita income from 1960 
to 2000 as our dependent variable, and again use the years since the onset of agriculture 
variable and the measures of early state history, as well as per capita income in 1500, as 
explanatory variables. 
 
The data used come primarily from Maddison (2001), AJR (2002), McEvedy and 
Jones (1978), Putterman (2003), and Hibbs and Olsson (2004). Maddison (2001) provides 
estimates of GDP per capita in 1500 in 1990 international dollars for a sample of 
countries and regions that we use to obtain the estimated relationship between GDP per 
capita, population densities and average urbanization rates. The data for population 
densities are calculated by using population numbers from Maddison (2001) and land 
area numbers from FAO Statistics.
4 Urbanization numbers are taken from Bairoch (1988) 
and are further augmented by numbers from AJR (2002).  GDP per capita numbers for a 
larger set of countries in 1500 are also taken from Maddison (2001), as are the numbers 
for 1960 and 1998. All these numbers are in 1990 international dollars (PPP adjusted). 
Further details for these variables are found in the appendix.  
 
The state history variables, which summarize whether present-day countries had 
states, giving more weight to indigenous states covering more of a country’s present 
territory, are taken from the “State Antiquity Appendix Version 2” used by Chanda and 
Putterman (forthcoming).  This is an improved version of the original data used in BCP.
5  
                                                 
4 In their original work AJR (2002) use arable land instead of actual area wherever possible. Although 
desirable in principle, the uneven availability of this information means that the approach can lead to 
substantial aberrations. For example, since McEvedy and Jones (1978), AJR’s primary source, lists data on 
arable land for Egypt but not for many other countries, the population density for Egypt is recorded as 100, 
which is four times the population density of the next highest countries—Rwanda and Burundi—and more 
than four times that of India (for which McEvedy and Jones do not record arable land area). To rule out 
such random occurrences we stuck with total land area. 
5 Despite changes, the old and new series are highly correlated; for example, the old and new values for the 
full measure to 1950 using a 5% backward discounting rate have a correlation of .8957.   6
The data begin in the year 1 of the common era, and are organized by half centuries.  As 
in both BCP and Chanda and Putterman, we continue to focus on versions of the variable 
that downweight for each additional half century in the past using a 5% depreciation rate.  
We use STATEHIST50, which considers the values for the first half century only, and 
STATEHIST500, STATEHIST1000 and STATEHIST1500, which use values for the 
first 500, 1000, and 1500 years, respectively.
6 
 
The variable AGYEARS is an estimate, in 2000 CE, of the number of years since 
a country’s transition from a foraging to an agricultural society.
7  This variable is based 
on Hibbs and Olsson (2004), who estimated the number of years from 10,000 BCE 
onwards to the establishment of agricultural societies, using a calibrated model that 
attributes the transition to the “bio-geographic” endowments – that is, endowments of 
wild grain pre-cursors and large animals suitable to domestication – as discussed by 
Diamond (1998).  
 
Table 1a summarizes the data for AGYEARS and the four state history measures. 
We summarize the data for the entire sample of countries for which such measures are 
available, for countries that were later colonized and were studied by AJR, and for the 
slightly larger sample of all non-OECD countries for which the data are available.
8 The 
AGYEARS variable in principle can have a highest possible value of 12,000, for 10,000 
BCE. According to the estimates however, the earliest agricultural civilizations date back 
to approximately 7,846 BCE (the “Fertile Crescent”, i.e. an AGYEAR value of 9846) and 
the most recent adopters of agriculture date back to 2,958 BCE (sub-Saharan Africa, 
Canada and the United States, with AGYEAR values of 4958 years). In our work in the 
                                                 
6 When calculating STATEHIST500, STATEHIST1000, and STATEHIST1500, we give full weight to the 
most recent half century and discount earlier half centuries progressively (by 1/(1.05), 1/(1.05)
2, etc.).  We 
then sum the discounted values for each country and normalize the sums so that the highest possible 
country value is 1 and the lowest is 0.  
7 Actual agricultural transitions may have taken hundreds of years, so the transition year should be 
understood to approximate the year in which agriculture first surpassed foraging as a source of food supply. 
8 Mexico and South Korea are included in our non-OECD sample since they were usually considered 
developing countries and joined the OECD only toward the end of the post-War period covered by our 
data.   7
rest of the paper, we scaled this variable to millennia rather than actual years, to allow for 
easier interpretation of coefficients in regression estimates.
9 
  
STATEHIST is a scaled variable and therefore can take a maximum value of 1 
irrespective of the terminal date. However the means indicate an expected upward trend. 
As one increases the terminal date, more countries begin to develop states. For example, 
we find that in 50 CE, only 34 of 107 countries covered had states. Moreover only eight 
countries recorded the full maximum value (for locally-run states covering the whole 
present-day territory) during that half century. Over the next 450 years only 5 more of 
today’s countries became the sites of governments. From 500 to 1000 CE, 10 more 
countries began to show signs of governments. Between 1000 and 1500 CE, as many as 
18 countries crossed the threshold.  Map 2 shows the extent of state history in 
contemporary countries covered by the STATEHIST data as of 1500.  As with many 
other measures of economic and social development, the subsequent 450 years of the 
second millennium was a period of acceleration with all of the remaining 40 countries 
covered also developing formal governments.  As Table 1A suggests, the experience with 
states seems to be lowest within the sample of colonized countries (also with the lowest 
variance). Further, there was little or no advancement within these countries in the first 
500 years. The colonized countries also were late, on average, in undergoing the 
Neolithic transition—hence their lower average AGYEARS value.  Lateness in 
developing agriculture, urban civilization, and the state may have influenced not only the 
level of development, but also the likelihood of becoming colonized by a European 
country (Diamond, 1998). 
 
Table 1b presents correlations between the same variables for the same samples. 
The very strong positive correlation between AGYEARS on one hand and the 
STATEHIST variables stand out.  Clearly the onset of agriculture had strong implications 
for the appearance and existence of states, as historians have often remarked.  Indeed, the 
correlation between having come early to agriculture and having a longstanding state 
                                                 
9 A drawback of the AGYEARS variable is that it takes on only six values—9846, 9262, 8194, 6151, 5881 
and 4958—because the biogeographic endowment data are available only for broad regions.  This 
limitation also applies to Hibbs and Olsson’s study.     8
later on actually strengthens with time in our sample, with STATEHIST1500 having the 
strongest correlation.
10   
 
 
3. Estimating GDP per Capita in 1500 
 
  Maddison (2001) provides estimates of per capita income in 1500 for a subset of 
the countries in our sample and for some broader regions. Due to the limited number of 
available estimates for income in 1500, AJR used estimates of urbanization rates in that 
year as a substitute for income.  We adopt a different strategy, that of estimating GDP per 
capita in 1500 based on the relationships between per capita income, urbanization, and 
population density.  Specifically, we ran OLS regressions for countries and regions in the 
Maddison sample with log of GDP per capita in 1500 as the dependent variable and, 
either a) only the urbanization rate in 1500 as an independent variable, or b) both the 
urbanization rate and the log of 1500 population density, as independent variables.  The 
logic for using urbanization as a correlate of GDP per capita is well motivated in AJR. In 
general, well developed agricultural technologies and extensive transportation networks 
are a prerequisite for high levels of urbanization.  The use of population density as a 
correlate of living standards is less straightforward, because in the pre-industrial period, 
population density could be considered an indicator of technological sophistication but 
not necessarily of higher average incomes (Galor and Weil (2000)). Despite this, the 
strong correlation between the GDP per capita in 1500 and population densities in 1500 
for the Maddison sample led us to use it along with urbanization rates in creating our 
second set of estimates. The estimated coefficients for the benchmark sample are listed in 
Table 2. These estimates are based on a sample of 32 major world regions and individual 
countries for which Maddison provides estimates. These are mostly European countries, 
their offshoots, a few other individual countries (India, China and Mexico) and regions 
                                                 
10 A priori one might have expected that the correlation with AGYEARS would be strongest for 
STATEHIST50, then STATEHIST500, STATEHIST1000, and last STATEHIST1500. It must be 
remembered, however, that while STATEHIST is a stock variable, the data on which it is based go back to 
1 CE only, so that in STATEHIST50, then young states like Guatemala’s are treated no differently from  
older states like Egypt’s or China’s. If we had a measure of the history of statehood as of 50 CE going back 
two thousand rather than 50 years, we would probably have found a stronger positive correlation between 
state history as of 50 CE and AGYEARS.   9
(Africa, Asia, etc.).  As the results suggest, using urbanization rates only explains 38% of 
the variation in log GDP per capita in 1500. Adding the logarithm of population density 
takes this up to 55% - a significant increase. How good are the estimates compared to the 
actual values of the dependent variable? Table 3 lists the summary statistics for the 
Maddison values, the two sets of predicted values for the sample corresponding to the 
benchmark regression, and two sets of predicted values for all countries for which 
urbanization and population densities are available. Restricting our attention to the first 
three rows, overall the predicted values are well in line with the observed values.
11  
 
Using these estimated coefficients, we compute predicted values of GDP per 
capita in 1500 for both in sample and out of sample countries, in this case using the 
population density estimates given by McEvedy and Jones for a larger sample of 
countries.
12  Turning to the predicted values for both out of sample and in sample 
countries, we again see fairly credible summary statistics. The urbanization only 
benchmark produces a minimum of $461, for the U.S., and a maximum of $1147, for 
Belgium. For the urbanization and population density benchmark the highest value of 
$1050 is again for Belgium and the lowest value of $327 is for Uruguay.
13 The next three 
lowest values are for the U.S., Canada and Australia. 
 
Table 3b lists the correlations between the log actual (i.e. Maddison) GDP per 
capita, log predicted GDP per capita and the determinants of the latter. The correlation 
between the actual GDP and the predicted values are fairly high, with the estimate based 
on both urbanization and population density more strongly correlated with the actual 
value. The correlation between the two predicted variables themselves is also extremely 
high at 0.88. If we incorporate the out of sample predictions (Table 3C), we continue to 
observe correlations of the same magnitude. In particular the correlation between the two 
                                                 
11 We also tried a regression where population density was the only independent variable. While the R-
Square was fairly high at 0.40, we found that there was a heavy downward bias. Compared to the observed 
maximum of $1100, the predicted maximum was only around $600 and the predicted minimum was also 
lower than the observed minimum. 
12 Notice that this procedure allows us to estimate GDP per capita in 1500 for present-day countries in 
regions, e.g. Africa, for which Maddison provides an estimate for the region as a whole, only. 
13 Maddison assumes that $400 is the subsistence level in 1500. Clearly adding population density as a 
determinant forces the estimates to go somewhat below this number.   10
predicted variables remains very high at 0.87.  Though the estimation technique is fairly 
basic, as far as we are aware this is the first constructed set of per capita incomes in 1500 
across such a broad cross section of countries. We find that the ratio of the highest to the 
lowest income per capita varies from 2.48 (urbanization only) to 3.21 (urbanization and 
population density), which is within a reasonable range of Maddison’s estimate of 2.67.  
For purposes of consistency, in the analysis that follows we use our predicted values 
rather than Maddison’s estimates for 1500 per capita income even when the latter are 
available.  
 
4. Testing Proposition (1): Influence of Early Development on Incomes on the Eve of 
European Expansion 
 
We are now ready to document our first proposition: that global variation in 
standards of living on the eve of European expansion is to a significant degree explained 
by differences in the timing of the development of agriculture and of large scale political 
systems.  Hibbs and Olsson (2004) have shown that an earlier onset of agriculture had 
long lasting effects and significantly affected living standards across the world as late as 
1997, but they did not investigate whether this was also the case in earlier years. BCP 
(2002) have shown that post-1960 economic growth rates have a strong positive 
correlation with their earlier measure of state history (constructed up to 1950).
14 Are 
agricultural onset and state history measures also correlated with estimated income levels 
in 1500?  Living standards were not as unequal then as they were at the end of the second 
millennium, and this dampened variation might lead to less interesting results in 1500. 
Despite that, the results in Table 4 support our first proposition.  Both STATEHIST and 
AGYEARS have significant correlations with log GDP per capita in 1500 and have the 
correct sign. The effects are more pronounced when both urbanization and population 
density are used to predict 1500 per capita income.  Almost half of the variance in 
predicted per capita income is explained by AGYEARS and STATEHIST1500, 
                                                 
14 The correlation of post-1960 growth rates with the updated measure of STATEHIST constructed up to 
1950 (used in Chanda and Putterman and in this paper) is 0.44– significant at the 1% level.  Also, 
consonant with Hibbs and Olsson’s result for income levels as opposed to growth rates, the correlation 
between updated STATEHIST1500 and 1995 per capita income is 0.24, significant at the 5% level.   11
according to the last column.
15 For a visual impression, the relationship between 
STATEHIST1500 and 1500 per capita income is shown in Figure 1.
16 
 
It would be interesting to see whether AGYEARS predicts income levels in 1500 
only via the existence of longer-established states, or whether it has direct effects as well. 
Columns (3) and (6) examine this question for the two estimates of GDP per capita. 
Unfortunately the results are mixed. When we use urbanization based income levels, it 
seems that STATEHIST1500 has the overriding effect on per capita income. On the other 
hand, if we focus on the urbanization and population density based estimates of GDP per 
capita, we clearly see that both STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS have direct effects. 
  
How large are the economic effects? Consider the effects of STATEHIST1500 
based on column 4. Peru has state history value and GDP per capita in 1500 of 0.65 and 
$560, respectively—the latter being approximately the sample mean. If Peru’s state 
history value increased by one standard deviation (0.35), taking it to the highest possible 
value, it’s GDP per capita in 1500 would rise to $630. Consider, instead, the effect of 
AGYEARS (based on column 5). According to estimates by Hibbs and Olsson, 
agricultural societies began to appear in Peru approximately 6150 years ago (later than 
the mean value of 7.3 millennia (see Table 1A)). If instead the transition had taken place 
one standard deviation (2.2 millennia) earlier (8350 years ago), Peru would have had a 
per capita income of $640 in 1500.While these numbers may not seem large at first 
glance, during the pre-industrial period estimated variation in average living standards 
was small and a move from $560 to $630 would be sufficient to take Peru from the 
sample mean to the top end of the distribution, ahead of the United Kingdom. 
 
5. Testing Proposition (2): The Colonial Era Reversal 
 
                                                 
15 We also examined the robustness of these relationships both a) when the sample is limited to AJR’s 
(2001) group of colonized countries and b) when the sample is limited to non-OECD countries. The results 
carry over, except that when both STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS are included, only the former is 
consistently statistically significant. 
16 Unlike the regression analysis, which uses predicted values of GDP per capita for all countries, Figure 1 
uses Maddison’s estimates when these are available.  Countries for which this is the case are distinguished 
in the figure by having their letter codes in bold typeface.   12
Having constructed values for GDP per capita in 1500 and having confirmed our 
first proposition—that levels of economic development in 1500 were substantially 
predictable by early agriculture and state formation—we now turn to our second 
proposition, which restates for the 1500 to 1960 period and also extends to non-colonized 
countries the AJR finding that countries that were more economically developed in 1500 
became less developed in the centuries that followed. Tables 5a and 5b examine the 
evidence. The dependent variable here is log GDP per capita in 1960.
17 The sample in 
Table 5a includes all colonized countries but excludes the countries that Maddison calls 
“Western offshoots” and Hibbs and Olsson call “neo-Europes”—that is, the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—as well as Hong Kong and Singapore.  We 
dropped the Western offshoots because we are more interested in examining the 
experiences of countries considered to be developing countries after 1960. Hong Kong 
and Singapore are dropped because of their unique city state characteristics.
18  The first 
four columns of Table 5a confirm the AJR finding—strong evidence of a reversal of 
fortunes by 1960. Column 1 confirms this result using the same variable as do AJR, while 
column 2 finds the same result using the related population density variable.  The third 
and fourth columns document the reversal when we use our predicted values for GDP per 
capita. Between the two values, the one based on urbanization and population density 
predicts a much stronger reversal.  
 
The last four columns of Table 5a test the reversal thesis using our measures of 
early development rather than income, urbanization and population density. Comparing 
column 5 of Table 5A to columns 1 and 4 of Table 4 further supports the reversal thesis: 
whereas a long history of supra-tribal polities is positively associated with income in 
1500, the correlation is negative and significant at the 1% level, for income in 1960.  
Column 6 finds AGYEARS to be statistically insignificant.  However, in columns 7 and 8 
we reran the regressions of columns 5 and 6 but now restricted our sample to only those 
                                                 
17 Unlike AJR, who focus on incomes in 1995, we concentrate on the change up to 1960, since our third 
proposition will be that the reversal during the colonial epoch was itself in the process of being reversed 
after that time. 
18 Due in part to that status, they are quite atypical in that while both city-states were nearly empty lands in 
1500, they absorbed the urban culture and thus “social capabilities” of neighboring China (for Singapore, 
China and India) and of colonizing power England far more rapidly and completely than did any country-
sized territory of the colonized and developing worlds.     13
countries for which we could construct GDP per capita data in 1500. This represents our 
core set of countries whose experiences in terms of GDP per capita can be traced over our 
three focal years of 1500, 1960 and 1998.  Within this smaller sample of countries 
AGYEARS is statistically significant.  For this core sample, STATEHIST1500 continues 
to predict the reversal and in fact registers a stronger negative effect.  There is also a 
significant jump in the R-Square in these columns. 
 
In Table 5b we repeat the exercise for developing countries rather than colonized 
countries.  The sample differs in that it includes a few countries such as China and South 
Korea which were never colonized by Europeans but are viewed as economically less 
developed or developing in the period after 1960. For the larger sample of countries 
AGYEARS does not seem to predict the reversal and is also insignificant. However all 
the other results allow us to conclude that the reversal of fortune documented for 
colonized countries by AJR holds more generally for countries of the developing world.  
 
6. Testing Proposition (3): The Resurgence of Non-European Early Developers 
 
  We last turn to our third proposition, which is that the advantages conferred by 
early agrarian development up to 1500 resurfaced during the post-World War II period, 
so that early developers grew faster than late ones in the latter period. Evidence on this 
proposition differs from that on the other two because the second half of the century was 
too short a period to bring about the full overturning of the effects of the previous 460 
years. Thus if we run regressions with 1998 log GDP per capita as the dependent variable 
and 1500 GDP per capita values as the independent variable, we still see some evidence 
of an overall reversal.
19  Since we are looking for the beginning of a process of reversing 
of AJR’s reversal rather than a complete overturning of the earlier reversal, our 
dependent variable for the post-War period is the annual growth rate in that period, not 
the achieved income level in the last observed year.  Because we used Maddison’s data 
for 1500 and 1960 for GDP per capita figures, we also use his numbers to construct the 
                                                 
19 We ran such regressions and found that the overall reversal was still true though much weaker than what 
was observed until 1960.  These results are available upon request.  As also mentioned, however, GDP in 
1995 is positively related to STATEHIST1500 in some samples.   14
growth rates in the post-War period. This, however, only allows us to construct growth 
rates from 1960 to 1998, since his numbers end with the latter year.  
 
Before starting, we quickly re-examine the reversal during 1500-1960 with 
growth rates as the dependent variable, to make sure that there is no suspicion of our 
having “baited and switched” the reader by focusing on terminal income in the analysis 
for 1500 and 1960 but on growth rates in the analysis for 1960 to 1998. Table 6 lists the 
results when growth rates from 1500 to 1960 are the dependent variables. We use the two 
possible growth rates based on our two estimates of log GDP per capita in 1500. The 
independent variables we examine are the two GDP per capita numbers which we 
constructed and the two measures of early development, STATEHIST1500 and 
AGYEARS. The results are as expected. Both estimates of initial GDP per capita have 
significant negative effects on growth rates during the subsequent 460 years – strong 
evidence of absolute convergence within this sample. STATEHIST1500 also has a strong 
negative effect on economic growth and so does AGYEARS.  Interestingly the R-squares 
are also quite high, especially when the independent variables are AGYEARS or the log 
of GDP per capita in 1500 based on both population density and urbanization. In sum, an 
AJR-style “reversal of fortunes” is also confirmed with respect to 1500-1960 growth 
rates. 
 
We are now ready to discuss the results for growth between 1960 and 1998, 
which are presented in Tables 7a and 7b.  Columns (1) and (2) document the effects of 
the 1500 GDP per capita numbers. When using urbanization as the only basis for 
establishing initial income we find a weak positive effect on growth rates during this 
period, which is significant at the 10% level in the non-OECD sample but not in the 
colonized country sample. On the other hand, the GDP per capita numbers extrapolated 
from both urbanization and population density register a positive effect significant at the 
10% level in the colonized sample and at the 5% level in the larger non-OECD sample.  
Columns (3) to (6) focus on state history and agricultural onset. Here the results still more 
strongly support our contention that early starters are again growing more rapidly in the 
post-War period.  Columns (3) and (4) represent the limited sample of countries for   15
which we could estimate 1500 GDP levels. As the results suggest, for this sample both 
STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS have significant effects on economic growth. In 
columns (5) and (6) we do not restrict the sample to just countries for which GDP per 
capita in 1500 is available.
20  The results continue to be robust—both state history and 
agricultural onset affect growth significantly at the 1% level. These results support our 
conjecture that countries that had an earlier start on development in pre-modern times 
have been growing more rapidly of late; the reversal of fortune has begun to be reversed.  
A visual impression is given by Figure 2, which plots the relationship between 
STATEHIST1500 and recent rates of economic growth. 
 
The estimated coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 provide some rather interesting 
contrasts. Consider for example Column (6) in Table 6 and column (2) in Table 7a. These 
two columns examine the effects of GDP per capita in 1500 on growth rates from 1500-
1960 and 1960-98, respectively, for the same sample of countries. Although the standard 
error is considerably higher in the second case, it is still worthwhile to note that the 
positive effect on growth during 1960-98 is at least twice as high as the negative effect on 
growth during 1500-1960. In the case of STATEHIST1500, the standard errors are more 
or less the same, but the positive effects during 1960-1998 are on the order of six times 
greater than the negative effects during 1500-1960. Comparing column (8) of Table 6 
with Column (4) of Table 7 for AGYEARS we again see that the magnitude is four times 
higher in the post 1960 period (though the standard error is much higher as well). Thus 
not only did the early starters manage to begin regaining their leadership but they seemed 
to be doing it at a much faster pace than they had previously been losing it.  In fact, the 
reversal process proceeded quickly enough so that, as Chanda and Putterman 
(forthcoming) show, the simple correlation between STATEHIST1500 and 1995 per 
capita income for a world sample of 95 countries was already positive and significant at 
the 5% level.
21  Hibbs and Olsson also find a significant positive relationship between 
early agricultural onset and per capita income in 1997. 
                                                 
20 The samples used to estimate columns 5 and 6 in Tables 7a and 7b correspond to columns 5 and 6 in 
Tables 6a and 6b respectively.   
21 BCP and Chanda and Putterman (forthcoming) show that STATEHIST1950 (called STATEHIST05 in 
BCP) is a significant positive predictor of 1995 income in some simple regressions.  Although this partial   16
 
A possible problem with these results is that this reversal of AJR’s reversal might 
simply be explained in terms of convergence dynamics. Absolute convergence suggests 
that countries that are relatively poorer should grow faster. While we know that absolute 
convergence does not hold for the large sample of world countries in the post-War period 
(DeLong (1988), Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992)), if one simply focused on the 37 
colonized countries for which we constructed 1500 GDP numbers, it does turn out to 
hold: the simple correlation between 1960 log GDP per capita and subsequent growth is  
- 0.3.  We know that log GDP per capita in 1500, STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS all 
have negative effects on 1960 per capita income levels. Therefore it might be natural to 
expect that if log GDP per capita in 1960 has a negative effect on economic growth, then 
all of these variables have a positive effect on economic growth.  
 
To see whether the effects of STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS on 1960-95 
growth are not simply picking up convergence dynamics, we rerun the regressions in 
Table 7 but with log GDP per capita in 1960 as a control variable.  Column (1) of Table 8 
is a basic regression that shows that absolute convergence holds for the 1960-98 period 
for the 37 countries for which data is available on GDP per capita in 1500.  Columns (2), 
(4) and (5) list the results for the three variables: log 1500 GDP per capita based on both 
urbanization and population density, STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS. This time 
around, we dropped the log GDP per capita estimate based on urbanization, since it had 
little predictive power for growth from 1960 to 1998. 
 
Column (2) of the table suggests that log GDP per capita in 1500 no longer has 
any power to predict the 1960-98 growth rates once we include log 1960 GDP per capita, 
which is also now insignificant. This probably implies that 1500 GDP per capita only 
works, in the regressions of Tables 7a and 7b, through its effect on GDP per capita in 
1960; thus its earlier recorded positive effect simply captured convergence dynamics.  A 
                                                                                                                                                 
correlation disappears when certain controls are added to a series of income level regressions, BCP show 
that STATEHIST1950 is an excellent instrument for Hall and Jones’ (1999) “social infrastructure” 
variable.   17
two stage regression which tests and supports this supposition appears in column (3).
22 
The instrumental variable used here is, of course, log of GDP per capita in 1500. It is not 
surprising that the effects of income levels in 1500 for post-War growth simply capture 
convergence – after all this is just an income measure and not some deeper institutional 
or geographical measure. When we turn to STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS in columns 
(4) and (5), however, we find that these variables continue to predict growth rates during 
the post-War period over and above any effects they may have on initial GDP per capita.  
In fact it seems that the overriding effect on the growth rate is the direct effects of these 
variables, since the initial GDP per capita now is no longer significant. In column 6 we 
repeat the same regression with the expanded sample. The significance of STATEHIST 
now actually rises and so does its economic effect. These results are similar for 
AGYEARS as well. For both sample sizes, AGYEARS is significant at the 1% level. 
Again, log GDP per capita in 1960 is no longer significant. Thus it seems that although 
countries that had had longer histories of agrarian state society suffered during the 
colonial era, they have begun to grow fast enough that they may soon fully rebound from 
this negative shock. Similar results on growth in the 1960-90 period are obtained by 
Burkett, Humblet and Putterman (1999) using as proxies for early development the 
Boserupean measures population density, cultivated acres per capita, and the irrigated 
share of cultivated land.  Greater early or pre-industrial development is associated with 
faster, not slower, economic growth in the late 20
th Century. 
 
While it is difficult to undertake robustness checks for regressions run in the first 
two parts of this paper because of a lack of data on other variables during the pre-1960 
period, it is possible to do this for growth between 1960 to 1998. Table 9 lists results 
which control for the some of the variables used in standard cross country growth 
regressions. These include the log of the investment rate, population growth rate and a 
human capital measure (secondary enrollment ratio). The first three columns list results 
when we do not control for the 1960 level of GDP per capita. The remaining three 
columns add this variable as well to test for the role of convergence dynamics discussed 
earlier. As is apparent from these regressions, STATEHIST1500 and AGYEARS are 
                                                 
22 Note that the first stage regression is the same as the one that appears in Column 4 of Table 5A   18
significant predictors of economic growth even after controlling for these variables. This 
is true even when the log of GDP per capita in 1960 is controlled for. However this is not 
true for log GDP per capita in 1500; as in table 8, it is only a significant predictor of 
growth when the 1960 GDP per capita is not included. As in most growth regressions, the 
investment rate is consistently significant. However this is not true for population growth 
rates and secondary enrollment rates. Finally, initial GDP per capita in 1960 is not 
consistently significant. In column (4) it is significant, while in columns (5) and (6) it is 
not significant. This suggests that long run geographical and institutional measures might 
have played a deeper role than simple convergence dynamics in determining growth rates 
in the second half of the twentieth century.
23 
  
7. Conclusion 
 
  Over most of economic history, an early start in agricultural development, leading 
to the growth of population density, cities, and polities above the tribal level, has 
conferred a continuing economic advantage, an effect recently confirmed for the present 
day by Hibbs and Olsson.  Yet, during the period of European economic expansion 
starting roughly in 1500, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson have demonstrated that early 
developers, at least among countries colonized by Europeans, experienced slower or even 
negative economic growth.   
 
In this paper, we show how these two opposing tendencies fit together.  We 
reconfirm, but for the much earlier and pivotal year 1500, Hibbs and Olsson’s result that 
early agrarian development conferred an advantage. We then demonstrate that the AJR 
result of a decline in the living standards of the non-European countries that were more 
advanced in 1500 holds also when we include non-colonized developing countries, when 
we leave out the “neo-Europes,” and when we use our derived estimates of income in 
1500 rather than their proxy for income, the urbanization rate.  And we show that an early 
start on agriculture and state formation had perverse effects on growth prospects between 
                                                 
23 BCP and Chanda and Putterman (forthcoming) undertake additional robustness tests, including in their 
post-War growth regressions the same ICRG institutional quality measure used by Hibbs and Olsson and 
used earlier by Knack and Keefer (1995), and ethnic heterogeneity as used in Easterly and Levine (1997).   19
1500 and 1960.  However, unlike AJR, we break the data at the year 1960 and find that 
the reversal process, which they extend right through 1995, was actually being undone 
during the post-World War II period, during which the effects of European expansion and 
colonialism appear finally to have been wearing off.  During 1960 – 1998, old agrarian 
societies like China, Taiwan, South Korea, and (more recently) India began to catch up 
with earlier industrializers, while most of the new states of sub-Saharan Africa, much of 
Latin America, and other countries that were less advanced with respect to agrarian state 
development, urbanization and population density in 1500, experienced slow or no net 
economic growth.   
 
Our findings may have an important bearing for the debate about the impact of 
institutions on economic growth.  While not necessarily challenging the proposition that 
institutional differences play a part in explaining differences in economic performance in 
recent decades, our finding that the “reversal of fortune” was a phenomenon that ended 
with post-World War II decolonization raises serious doubts about AJR’s claim that 
institutions put in place at the time of colonization have persisted in their effects to the 
present day.  In recent decades, centuries-old differences in “social capability” 
(Abramovitz, 1995; Chanda and Putterman, 2004) seem to count for more than do traces 
of property rights regimes reflecting differing needs of colonial masters. 
 
What, exactly, is the advantage conferred by early agrarian development?  While 
this is not the place for a lengthy exposition, it seems that the early development of 
agriculture and the state may have brought in its wake not only increases in economic 
specialization and population density, but also changes in culture and institutional 
capabilities.
24  Although Western Europe’s break from the Eurasian pack to establish 
trading, colonial, and industrial hegemony over most of the world temporarily turned the 
relationship between early development and growth on its head outside of Europe,
25 the 
institutional capacities of those old societies that were not too far behind Europe in 1500 
                                                 
24 More extended expositions are found in Putterman, 2000 and Chanda and Putterman, 2004.  See also the 
review article by Diamond, 2004. 
25 There is a large literature on why the industrial revolution took place first in Europe.  Interesting 
treatments include those of Diamond, 1998, Landes, 1999, and Pomeranz, 2000.   20
were once again putting them at an advantage in the late 20
th Century.
26  This suggests 
that building up social capabilities is a very long-term process, and that although that 
process might be shortened through well chosen capacity-building programs, it doesn’t 
serve policy-makers well to underestimate the size of the task. 
 
 
                                                 
26 We are well aware of the challenge that some early developers, especially in the “fertile crescent” and 
Egypt, have not done very well of late.  Diamond, 1998 and 2004, attributes the “fertile crescent’s” current 
state to ecological fragility and over-exploitation.  Relative to Western Europe and East Asia, the long-term 
decline of the old fertile crescent and Egypt relative to Western Europe and East Asia may arguably already 
have been in evidence by 1500.  Yet some observers believe that Egypt and Iraq could be Middle East 
success stories given the right policies.   21
 
Data Appendix 
 
State History (STATEHIST50, STATEHIST500, STATEHIST1000, STATEHIST1500): We 
began by dividing the period from 1 to 1950 C.E. into39 half centuries. For each period 
of fifty years, we asked three questions (and allocated points) as follows: 1. Is there a 
government above the tribal level? (1 point if yes, 0 points if no); 2. Is this government 
foreign or locally based? (1 point if locally based, 0.5 points if foreign [i.e., the country is 
a colony], 0.75 if in between [a local government with substantial foreign oversight]; 3. 
How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this government? (1 point 
if over 50%, 0.75 points if between 25% and 50%, 0.5 points if between 10% and 25%, 
0.3 points if less than 10%). Answers were extracted from the historical accounts on each 
of 107 countries in the Encyclopedia Britannica, including the regional articles in the 
Macropedia section. The scores on the three questions were multiplied by one another 
and by 50, so that for a given fifty year period, what is today a country has a score of 50 
if it was an autonomous nation, 0 if it had no government above the tribal level, 25 if the 
entire territory was ruled by another country, and so on. We then combined the data for 
various time periods (half centuries). .For example to construct STATEHIST1500 we 
used the first 30 half centuries. We experimented with different ways of “discounting” to 
reduce the weight of periods in the more remote past (All results in this paper use the 5% 
discount rate). Finally in order to make the series easier to interpret, the resulting sum 
was divided by the maximum possible value the series could take given the same rate of 
discounting the past. Thus the value that the index can take for any given country lies 
between zero and one.  A summary for each country is available in Putterman (2003). 
 
Years since the Onset of Agriculture (AGYEARS): Calibrated estimates of approximate 
number of years since regions moved from foraging to agricultural societies using 
2000CE as the year of reference. Original data comes from Hibbs and Olsson (2004).  
 
Population Density: Calculated from population numbers and total land area from 
McEvedy and Jones (1978). For the estimates of Table 2, the numbers for the included 
world regions are taken from Maddison (2001), while the numbers for individual 
countries are those from McEvedy and Jones.  
 
Urbanization: There are two sets of numbers here. The first set of numbers is used to run 
the benchmark regressions to estimate the relationship between urbanization and 
Maddison’s GDP per capita estimates in 1500. Urbanization rates for this sample comes 
mainly from Bairoch (1988), supplemented by AJR (2001). This includes mostly 
European countries and major world regions. The second sample of urbanization numbers 
used to construct the expanded set (mostly colonized countries) of GDP per capita in 
1500 comes from AJR (2001). 
 
GDP per capita in 1500: The raw numbers are in 1990 international dollars and are taken 
from Maddison (2001). The expanded sample is based on the regressions in Table 2. 
   22
GDP per capita in 1960 and 1998: These are in 1990 international dollar numbers and 
are taken from Maddison (2001). 
 
Investment Rate (1960-2000) and Population Growth Rate (1960-2000): This is 
constructed from Penn World Tables version 6.1. For most countries the data ends at 
1998 and thus the average reflects a 60-98 average. 
 
Secondary Enrollment Ratio (1960): From the data set for Barro and Lee (1994).  
 
Country list and data availability 
 
Country  
country 
code 
1500 gdp
per cap  AGYEARS
statehist
1500 
1500 pop 
density 
Urbanization
1500 
growth 
60-98 
(core sample, colonized)      
Algeria DZA  1  1 1  1 1
Argentina ARG  1 1 1 1  1 1
Bangladesh BGD  1 1 1 1  1 1
Belize BLZ  1 1  1  1 1
Bolivia BOL  1 1 1 1  1 1
Brazil BRA  1 1 1 1  1 1
Chile CHL  1 1 1 1  1 1
Colombia COL  1 1 1 1  1 1
Costa Rica  CRI  1 1 1 1  1 1
Dominican Republic  DOM  1 1 1 1  1 1
Ecuador ECU  1 1 1 1  1 1
Egypt, Arab Rep.  EGY  1 1 1 1  1 1
El Salvador  SLV  1 1 1 1  1 1
Guatemala GTM  1 1 1 1  1 1
Guyana GUY  1  1 1  1 1
Haiti HTI  1 1 1 1  1 1
Honduras HND  1 1 1 1  1 1
India IND  1 1 1 1  1 1
Indonesia IDN  1 1 1 1  1 1
Jamaica JAM  1 1 1 1  1 1
Lao PDR  LAO  1 1  1  1 1
Malaysia MYS  1 1 1 1  1 1
M e x i c o  M E X   1 111   11
Morocco MAR  1 1 1 1  1 1
Myanmar MMR  1  1 1  1 1
Nicaragua NIC  1  1 1  1 1
Pakistan PAK  1 1 1 1  1 1
Panama PAN  1 1 1 1  1 1
Papua New Guinea  PNG  1 1 1 1  1 1
Paraguay PRY  1 1 1 1  1 1
Peru PER  1 1 1 1  1 1
Philippines PHL  1 1 1 1  1 1
Sri Lanka  LKA  1 1 1 1  1 1  23
Tunisia TUN  1 1 1 1  1 1
Uruguay URY  1 1 1 1  1 1
Venezuela, RB  VEN  1  1 1  1 1
Vietnam VNM  1    1  1 1
(other non-OECD sample)          
Afghanistan AFG      1 1    1
Angola AGO      1 1    1
Bahamas, The  BHS        1    
Barbados BRB      1 1     
Benin BEN    1 1 1    1
Botswana BWA    1 1 1    1
Burkina Faso  BFA    1 1 1    
Burundi BDI    1 1 1     
Cameroon CMR    1 1 1    1
Cape Verde  CPV    1 1 1   1
Central African Republic  CAF    1 1 1   1
Chad TCD    1 1 1     
Comoros COM    1  1    1
Congo, Dem. Rep.  ZAR    1  1    
Congo, Rep.  COG      1 1   1
Cote d'Ivoire  CIV    1 1 1   1
Cuba CUB        1    1
Dominica DMA        1     
Eritrea ERI        1     
Ethiopia ETH    1 1 1     
Gabon GAB      1 1    1
Gambia, The  GMB    1 1 1   1
Ghana GHA    1 1 1    1
Grenada GRD        1     
Guinea GIN    1 1 1     
Guinea-Bissau GNB    1  1     
Kenya KEN    1 1 1    1
Lesotho LSO    1 1 1     
Madagascar MDG    1 1 1    1
Malawi MWI    1 1 1     
Mali MLI    1 1 1    1
Mauritania MRT    1 1 1    1
Mozambique MOZ    1 1 1    1
Namibia NAM    1  1   1
Nepal NPL    1 1 1    1
Niger NER    1 1 1    1
Nigeria NGA      1 1    1
Rwanda RWA    1 1 1   1
Senegal SEN    1 1 1   1
Sierra Leone  SLE    1  1   1
Somalia SOM        1   1
South Africa  ZAF    1 1 1   1
St. Kitts and Nevis  KNA        1      24
St. Lucia  LCA        1    
St. Vincent and the Grenadines VCT        1    
Sudan SDN    1  1    1
Suriname SUR        1     
Swaziland SWZ    1 1 1    1
Tanzania TZA    1  1    1
Togo TGO    1 1 1    1
Trinidad and Tobago  TTO      1 1   1
Uganda UGA    1 1 1    1
Zambia ZMB    1 1 1    1
Zimbabwe ZWE    1 1 1    1
(other countries)        
Albania ALB        1     
Antigua and Barbuda  ATG        1    
Aruba ABW        1     
Bahrain  BHR         1
Bermuda BMU        1     
Bulgaria BGR    1  1     
Bulgaria BGR    1  1     
Cambodia KHM        1    1
Cayman Islands  CYM        1    
China CHN  1 1 1 1  1 1
Cyprus CYP      1 1     
Czech  Republic  CZE    1     
Djibouti  DJI         1
Equatorial Guinea  GNQ    1  1    
Fiji FJI      1     
Georgia  GEO    1     
Hungary HUN  1 1  1  1 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  IRN      1 1   1
Iraq IRQ        1    1
Israel ISR    1 1    1
Jordan JOR    1 1 1    1
Korea, Dem. Rep.  PRK            1
Korea, Rep.  KOR  1 1 1 1  1 1
Kuwait  KWT         1
Latvia  LVA    1     
Lebanon LBN        1   1
Liberia LBR        1    1
Malta  MLT    1     
Mauritius MUS    1 1    1
Mongolia MNG    1  1    1
Netherlands Antilles  ANT        1    
Oman OMN        1    1
Poland POL    1  1     
Puerto Rico  PRI        1   1
Qatar  QAT         1
Romania ROM    1  1       25
Russian Federation  RUS  1    1  1 1
Sao Tome and Principe  STP        1    
Saudi  Arabia  SAU         1
Seychelles  SYC         1
Slovak  Republic  SVK    1     
Syrian Arab Republic  SYR    1 1 1   1
Taiwan, China  OAN    1 1 1   1
Thailand THA    1 1 1   1
T u r k e y  T U R   1 111   11
United  Arab  Emirates  ARE         1
West Bank and Gaza  WBG            1
Yemen, Rep.  YEM        1    
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.  YUG        1    
Austria AUT  1 1 1 1  1 1
Belgium BEL  1 1 1 1  1 1
Denmark DNK  1 1 1 1  1 1
Finland FIN  1 1 1 1  1 1
France FRA  1 1 1 1  1 1
Germany DEU  1 1 1 1  1 1
Greece GRC  1 1 1 1  1 1
Iceland ISL      1 1     
Ireland IRL    1 1 1    1
Italy ITA  1 1 1 1  1 1
Japan JPN  1 1 1 1  1 1
Luxembourg  LUX    1     
Netherlands NLD  1 1 1 1  1 1
Norway NOR  1 1 1 1  1 1
Portugal PRT  1 1 1 1  1 1
Spain ESP  1 1 1 1  1 1
Sweden SWE  1 1 1 1  1 1
Switzerland CHE  1 1 1 1  1 1
United Kingdom  GBR  1 1 1 1  1 1
Canada CAN  1 1 1 1  1 1
Australia AUS  1  1 1  1 1
New Zealand  NZL  1  1 1  1 1
United States  USA  1 1 1 1  1 1
Hong Kong, China  HKG  1 1 1 1  1 1
Singapore SGP  1 1 1 1  1 1
Libya LBY  1    1  1 
 
Note: a 1 indicates that data are available for the country and variable.  26
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Table 1a 
Agricultural Onset and State History: 
Summary Statistics 
 
 Observations Mean  Std 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Sample: All 
Countries 
       
AGYEARS  111 7.31 2.2 4.96 9.85
STATEHIST50  107 0.20 0.32 0.00 1.00
STATEHIST500  107 0.21 0.31 0.00 1.00
STATEHIST1000  107 0.26 0.32 0.00 1.00
STATEHIST1500  107 0.31 0.33 0.00 1.00
          
Sample: 
Colonized 
Countries 
        
          
AGYEARS 71 6.14 1.68 4.96  9.85
STATEHIST50 77 0.14 0.30 0.00  1.00
STATEHIST500 77 0.14 0.28 0.00  1.00
STATEHIST1000 77 0.17 0.29 0.00  1.00
STATEHIST1500 77 0.22 0.31 0.00  1.00
          
Sample: Non 
OECD Countries 
       
          
AGYEARS 91 6.86 2.09 4.96  9.85
STATEHIST50 85 0.19 0.34 0.00  1.00
STATEHIST500 85 0.19 0.32 0.00  1.00
STATEHIST1000 85 0.22 0.32 0.00  1.00
STATEHIST1500 85 0.27 0.33 0.00  1.00
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 Table 1b 
Agricultural Onset and State History: 
Correlations 
 
 AGYEARS  S50  S500  S1000  S1500 
Sample: All 
Countries (n=88) 
       
AGYEARS 1.00  
STATEHIST50  0.51 1.00  
STATEHIST500  0.59 0.94 1.00  
STATEHIST1000 0.70 0.84 0.93 1.00 
STATEHIST1500 0.75 0.73 0.82 0.94  1.00
          
Sample: 
Colonized 
Countries (n=63) 
       
          
AGYEARS 1.00  
STATEHIST50 0.51 1.00   
STATEHIST500 0.55 0.98 1.00    
STATEHIST1000 0.62 0.91 0.94 1.00 
STATEHIST1500 0.66 0.78 0.82 0.93  1.00
          
Sample: Non 
OECD Countries 
(n=69) 
       
          
AGYEARS 1.00  
STATEHIST50 0.57 1.00   
STATEHIST500 0.61 0.98 1.00    
STATEHIST1000 0.68 0.91 0.94 1.00 
STATEHIST1500 0.71 0.80 0.84 0.94  1.00
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Table 2 
Estimating GDP per capita in 1500 
 
 1  2 
    
Constant 6.133*** 
(0.062) 
6.132*** 
(0.05) 
Urbanization in 
1500 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
Log Population 
Density in 1500 
 0.058*** 
(0.015) 
    
R-Square 0.38  0.55 
Observations 32  32 
 
 
 
Table 3a 
Summary statistics for Maddison estimates and predicted 1500 GDP per capita 
 
 Obsvns  Mean  Std  Deviation  Min  Max 
Maddison’s GDP 
pc estimates 
32 595  168  411  1100 
Predicted GDP pc 
(Urbanization 
only) 
32 587  123  461  1147 
Predicted GDP pc 
(Urbn + Popden) 
32 593  121  367  1050 
Predicted GDP pc 
(Urbanization 
only) 
74 565  94  461  1147 
Predicted GDP pc 
(Urbn + Popden) 
72 557  107  327  1050   31
Table 3b 
Correlations between Maddison and predicted GDP per capita,  
population density and urbanization rates. 
(32 observations) 
  Log GDP pc 
1500 
(Maddison)  
Predicted Log 
GDP pc 1500  
(urbanization) 
Predicted Log 
GDP pc 1500  
(density+urbn)
Urbanization 
Rates 1500 
Log 
Population 
Density 
1500 
Log GDP pc 
1500 
(Maddison) 
1.00        
Predicted Log 
GDP pc1500  
(urbanization) 
0.57 1.00       
Predicted Log 
GDP pc 1500  
(density+urbn) 
0.74 0.88  1.00     
Urbanization 
Rates 1500  0.57 1.00  0.88 1.00   
Log 
Population 
Density 1500 
0.73 0.59  0.90 0.59  1.00 
 
Table 3c 
Correlations between predicted GDP per capita,  
population density and urbanization rates. 
(72 observations) 
  Predicted Log 
GDP pc 1500  
(urbanization) 
Predicted Log 
GDP pc 1500  
(density+urbn)
Urbanization 
Rates 1500 
Log 
Population 
Density 
1500 
Predicted Log 
GDP pc1500  
(urbanization)  1     
Predicted Log 
GDP pc 1500  
(density+urbn)  0.87 1     
Urbanization 
Rates 1500  1 0.87 1  
Log 
Population 
Density 1500  0.59 0.91 0.59 1 
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Table 4 
Explaining (predicted) GDP per capita in 1500 
 
  1 2 3  4 5 6 
 Dependent  Variable 
  Predicted Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbanization only) 
Predicted Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbn + popden) 
Constant 6.227*** 
(0.018) 
6.059*** 
(0.08) 
6.18*** 
(0.08) 
6.146***
(0.028) 
5.798*** 
(0.099) 
5.96*** 
(0.096) 
STATEHIST 
1500 
0.246*** 
(0.046)  
 0.206*** 
(0.05) 
0.395***
(0.058) 
 0.265*** 
(0.075) 
AGYEARS   0.034*** 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
 0.064*** 
(0.012) 
0.03** 
(0.013) 
          
Observations  59 55  52 59 55  52 
R-  Square  0.31 0.16  0.27 0.46 0.36  0.47 
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Table 5a 
Documenting the Reversal of Fortune 
Dependent Variable: Log GDP per capita 1960 
Sample: Colonized countries (excludes Hong Kong,  
Singapore and Western Offshoots) 
 
  1  2 3  4 5 6  7*  8* 
             
Urbanization 
1500 
-.044** 
(0.023) 
         
Log 
Population 
Density 1500 
 -0.223*** 
(0.044) 
        
Log GDP pc 
1500 
(urbanization 
only) 
   -1.83** 
(0.953) 
      
Log GDP pc 
1500 
(urbn 
+popden) 
     -2.549*** 
(0.588) 
     
STATEHIST 
1500 
       -0.627*** 
(0.236) 
 -0.973*** 
(0.257) 
 
AGYEARS         -0.014 
(0.037) 
 -0.26*** 
(0.045) 
             
R-Square  0.10 0.21  0.10  0.34  0.07 0.001  0.26 0.51 
Observations  37  73 37  37 63 59  34 31 
Notes: Columns (7) and (8) restricts the sample to countries for which we also have 
estimated 1500 GDP numbers. Constant included but suppressed 
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Table 5b 
Documenting the Reversal of Fortune 
Dependent Variable: Log GDP per capita 1960 
Sample: Non-OECD countries (excludes Hong Kong and Singapore) 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7*  8* 
            
Urbanization 
1500 
-.046** 
(0.022) 
           
Log 
Population 
Density 1500 
 -.180*** 
(0.045) 
          
Log GDP pc 
1500 
(urbanization 
only) 
   -1.897** 
(0.938) 
        
Log GDP pc 
1500 
(urbn 
+popden) 
     -2.483*** 
(0.552) 
     
STATEHIST 
1500 
       -.441** 
(0.221) 
 -.921*** 
(0.237) 
 
AGYEARS           0.016 
(0.038) 
 -.237*** 
(0.048) 
               
R-Square  0.11 0.14  0.11  0.34  0.04 0.002  0.27  0.45 
Observations  40  88 40  40  72  69  37 34 
Notes: Columns (7) and (8) restrict the sample to countries for which we also have 
estimated 1500 GDP numbers.  
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Table 6 
Documenting the Reversal: Growth Rate between 1500 and 1960 
Sample: Colonized countries (excluding Hong Kong,  
Singapore and Western Offshoots) 
 
  1 2 3  4  5  6 7 8 
  1500-1960 Avg. Annual Growth 
Rate 
(1500 income estimate based on 
urbanization only) 
1500-1960 Avg. Annual Growth 
Rate 
(1500 income estimate based on 
urbanization & population density) 
             
Log GDP pc 
1500 
(urbanization 
only) 
-.006*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
    
Log GDP pc 
1500 
(urbn 
+popden) 
 -.007*** 
(0.001) 
    -.007*** 
(0.001) 
  
STATEHIST 
1500 
   -.002*** 
(0.0005) 
     -.002*** 
(0.0006) 
 
AGYEARS      -.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
    -.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
              
R-Square  0.21 0.47 0.35  0.53  0.20 0.51 0.35 0.52 
Observations  37 37 34  31  37  37 34  31 
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Table 7a  
Dependent Variable: Growth from 1960 to 1998 
Sample: Colonized countries (excludes Hong Kong,  
Singapore and Western Offshoots) 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
            
Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbanization 
only) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
      
Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbn +popden) 
 0.015* 
(0.008) 
      
STATEHIST1500     0.012*** 
(0.004) 
 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
AGYEARS       0.002*** 
(0.0009)     
 0.004*** 
(0.0008)    
            
R-Square  0.02 0.05  0.17  0.24  0.09  0.23 
Observations  37 37  34  31  63  59 
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Table 7b 
Dependent Variable: Growth from 1960 to 1998 
Sample: Non-OECD countries (excludes Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Western Offshoots) 
  
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
            
Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbanization 
only) 
0.025* 
(0.013) 
      
Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbn +popden) 
 0.03** 
(0.012) 
      
STATEHIST1500     0.019*** 
(0.005) 
 0.02*** 
(0.005) 
 
AGYEARS        0.004***   
(0.001)    
 0.005***   
(0.0009)    
            
R-Square  0.04 0.12  0.28  0.28  0.17  0.30 
Observations  41 41  37  34  72  69 
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Table 8 
Growth From 1960 to 1998 after controlling for 1960 GDP per capita 
Sample: Colonized countries (excludes Hong Kong,  
Singapore and Western Offshoots) 
  
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
  OLS  OLS 2SLS OLS OLS  OLS  OLS 
Log GDP pc 1960  -
0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-.006** 
(0.002 
-0.002 
(0.003)
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.0003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbn +popden) 
 0.005 
(0.010) 
        
STATEHIST1500      0.010* 
(0.006) 
 
 0.0143*** 
(0.005) 
 
AGYEARS       0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.0009) 
           
R-Square  0.08 0.09  --  0.19 0.31  0.09  0.23 
Observations  37 37 37 34 31  63  59 
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Table 9 
Growth From 1960 to 1998  
Robustness Check 
Sample: Colonized countries (excludes Hong Kong,  
Singapore and Western Offshoots) 
  
  1  2 3 4  5 6 
          
Log GDP pc 1500 
(urbn +popden) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
   0.006 
(0.013) 
  
STATEHIST1500   0.018*** 
(0.004) 
   0.013*** 
(0.005) 
 
AGYEARS     0.003*** 
(0.001) 
   0.003** 
(0.001) 
Log(INV19602000)  0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
Population Growth 
(1960-2000) 
-0.434 
(0.441) 
0.200 
(0.354) 
0.529* 
(0.314) 
-0.089 
(0.420) 
0.093 
(0.313) 
0.427 
(0.331) 
Secondary 
Enrollment Ratio 
1960 
0.005 
(0.024) 
0.035 
(0.022) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.024) 
0.052** 
(0.022) 
0.036 
(0.023) 
Log GDP pc 1960       -.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
         
         
R-Square  0.18 0.36  0.44 0.31 0.41 0.46 
Observations  32 56  50 32 56 50   40
Map 1 
   41
Map 2 
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Figure 1.  GDP per capita in 1500 plotted against STATEHIST1500.
27   
                                                 
27 Countries whose codes appear in bold typeface are plotted using 1500 income estimates by Maddison; 
the others use predicted 1500 income based on urbanization and population density in 1500.  Line drawn is 
best fitting linear relationship between the two variables.   43
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Figure 2.  1960-98 GDP per capita growth plotted against STATEHIST1500.
28  
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Line drawn is best fitting linear relationship between the two variables. 